Chapter 12. Investigation of Suffering

Some hold that suffering is made by itself, made by another, made by both, or without a cause; but as an effect it does not work out.

If it were made by itself, it would not arise in dependence; yet these skandhas arise in dependence on those skandhas.

If these were other than those, or those other than these, then suffering would be made by another — these would be made by those as others.

If suffering is made by one’s own person — then who is that own person who would exist apart from suffering and make it himself?

If suffering is produced by another person — then the one to whom it is handed over, after the other has made it, where would he come from apart from suffering?

If suffering is produced by another person — then who is that other person who, existing apart from suffering, would make it and pass it on to another?

Since being made by itself is not established, how could it be made by another? For the suffering that another would make would, for him, be made by himself.

First, suffering is not made by itself — for it is not made by that very thing; and if the other is not made by himself, how could suffering be made by another?

Suffering would be made by both — if it were made by each of them separately; and if it is made neither by another nor by itself, how could suffering be without a cause?

Not only are these four ways absent in the case of suffering: for external existents too the four ways are not found.