Chapter 23. Investigation of Distortions

Passion, aversion and delusion are said to arise from imagining; for they come to be in dependence on the distortions [regarding] the good and the bad.

Those that come to be in dependence on the distortions [regarding] the good and the bad do not exist by own nature; therefore the kleśas are not truly [real].

The existence and the non-existence of a “self” are in no way established; without it, how are the existence and the non-existence of the kleśas established?

For these kleśas belong to someone — but that [someone] is not established; and without someone, the kleśas do not exist in anyone.

The kleśas, like the view of one’s own body, do not exist in the one afflicted by them in any of the five ways; and the one afflicted by the kleśas, like the view of one’s own body, does not exist in the kleśas in any of the five ways either.

The distortions [regarding] the good and the bad do not exist by own nature; in dependence on which distortions, then, do the kleśas [arise]?

Form, sound, taste, touch, smell and dharmas — these six kinds of ground for passion, aversion and delusion are imagined.

Form, sound, taste, touch, smell and dharmas, taken in themselves, have the look of a city of gandharvas, and are like a mirage or a dream.

How could there be the good or the bad in them, which are like an illusory person and equal to a reflection?

Without relying on the good we could not declare the bad; and since the good [is established] in dependence [on the bad], the good is therefore not possible.

Without relying on the bad we could not declare the good; and since the bad [is established] in dependence [on the good], the bad therefore does not exist.

And when the good does not exist, whence will passion come? And when the bad does not exist, whence will aversion come?

If the grasping “the impermanent is permanent” is a distortion, then in what is empty there is no impermanent — so whence this grasping-distortion?

If the grasping “the impermanent is permanent” is a distortion, then why is the grasping “what is empty is impermanent” not a distortion?

That by which one grasps, the grasping itself, the one who grasps, and what is grasped — all of this is stilled; therefore grasping does not exist.

And when there is no grasping, whether mistaken or correct, in whom would there be distortion? In whom would there be non-distortion?

Distortions do not arise in one who is [already] distorted; nor do distortions arise in one who is not distorted.

Distortions do not arise in one who is [just now] becoming distorted; examine it for yourself — in whom do distortions arise?

How at all will distortions come to be, if they do not arise? And if distortions are unborn, whence comes the one who abides in distortion?

An existent does not arise from itself, nor does it arise from another, nor from both itself and another — so whence comes the one who abides in distortion?

If “self”, purity, permanence and happiness exist, then “self”, purity, permanence and happiness are not a distortion.

And if “self”, purity, permanence and happiness do not exist, then non-self, impurity, impermanence and suffering do not exist either.

Thus ignorance ceases through the ceasing of distortions; and when ignorance has ceased, the formations and the rest cease.

If some kleśas exist in someone by own nature, how at all could they be removed? Who would remove own nature?

If some kleśas do not exist in someone by own nature, how at all could they be removed? Who would remove non-existence?