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Chapter 27. Investigation of Views

dṛṣṭiparīkṣā · 30 verses · 1 posts
N
nāgārjuna
author of the verses
#1Nāgārjuna

“I existed in past time” and “I did not exist” — these are the views about the eternity of the world and the rest, which rest upon the prior limit.

“Shall I be, shall I be someone else, shall I not be” in future time — these views about a “limit” and the rest rest upon the later limit.

“I existed in past time” — this statement does not hold; for the one who was in previous births is not this very present one.

If that very one were the self, then clinging would be something separate; but what self of yours is there, then, set apart from clinging?

Once it is established that there is no self set apart from clinging, then clinging itself would be the self; but on your view, again, there is no self at all.

And clinging is not itself the self: it passes away and it arises; for how could clinging ever become the one who clings?

On the other hand, a self other than clinging does not hold either; for, being without clinging, it would have to be apprehended — yet it is not apprehended.

Thus the self is neither other than clinging nor clinging itself; the self is neither something without clinging nor something that does not exist at all — this is the conclusion.

“I did not exist in past time” — this statement does not hold; for the one who was in previous births is not other than this present one.

For if this present one were another, he would exist even when that one is set aside; and that one would likewise continue on, and in him an immortal would be born.

From this it would follow that there is annihilation, that deeds perish, and that a deed done by one would be experienced by another — and so on.

Nor is it that he arose without having existed before, for from this a fault would follow: the self would be either something made or something arisen without a cause.

Thus the views concerning the past — “I was,” “I was not,” “both,” “neither” — none of them holds.

And the view concerning future time — “shall I be,” “shall I not be” — is just the same as the one concerning past time.

If the one who is a god and the one who is a human are the very same, then the eternal follows; and the god would be unborn, since what is eternal is not born.

If the human is other than the god, then the non-eternal would follow; and if the human is other than the god, continuity does not hold.

If one part were divine and one part human, then both the non-eternal and the eternal would follow at once; and that does not hold.

If both the non-eternal and the eternal were established together, then, this being established, “neither eternal” and “neither non-eternal” would have to be established as well.

If someone came from somewhere and went again somewhere, then saṃsāra would be without beginning; but it is not such.

And if nothing eternal exists, what then will be non-eternal? “Both eternal and non-eternal” — both these views are rejected.

If the world had a limit, how would there be another world? And if the world is limitless, how would there be another world?

Since this is a continuity of skandhas, like the flames of lamps, therefore neither limitlessness nor having a limit holds.

If the earlier skandhas were destroyed and these did not arise in dependence on those skandhas, then the world would have a limit.

If the earlier skandhas were not destroyed and these did not arise in dependence on those skandhas, then the world would be limitless.

If one part had a limit and one part were limitless, then the world would be both with a limit and limitless; and that does not hold.

How, then, would one part of the one who clings perish while one part does not perish? Therefore this does not hold.

And how would one part of clinging perish while one part does not perish? This too does not hold.

If both “with a limit” and “limitless” were established together, then, this being established, “neither with a limit” and “neither limitless” would have to be established as well.

Or rather: since all existents are empty, the views about eternity and the rest — where, in whom, which of them, and from what could they arise?

To him who, out of compassion, taught the true dharma for the abandoning of all views — to Gautama — I pay homage.

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Every verse here is genuine and stands in its own order — the forum is only a way of breaking the chapter up. Not a single line in these posts was added.

Where a second voice appears, it is the pūrvapakṣa: the opponent’s position, stated by Nāgārjuna in his own words so that he can take it apart.