Chapter 1. Investigation of Conditions

Nowhere and never are any things found that have arisen from themselves, from another, from both [together], or without a cause.

nāgārjuna wrote:

have arisen from themselves, from another, from both [together], or without a cause

There are four conditions: the causal, the objective, the immediately preceding, and the dominant — there is no fifth condition.

abhidharmika wrote:

There are four conditions: the causal, the objective, the immediately preceding, and the dominant

For the own nature of things is not contained in the conditions and the like. And in the absence of an own nature there is no other-nature either.

An action does not possess the conditions [that brought this action about], but neither is it devoid of conditions. And the conditions are neither devoid of action nor endowed with it.

They say: “[The effect] arises in dependence on these [factors]” — and that is why they are called conditions. But as long as the effect has not yet arisen, why are these [factors] not non-conditions?

A condition is suitable neither for what does not exist nor for what exists. For if the object does not exist — whose condition would it be? And if it already exists — what does it need a condition for?

If a dharma is not produced — neither as existing, nor as non-existing, nor as both existing and non-existing at once — then how, in such a case, can a cause that produces it be appropriate?

This existing dharma is taught precisely as being without an object. But if a dharma has no object — where would an object then come from?

If dharmas have not yet arisen, cessation is impossible. Therefore the “immediately preceding” condition is inappropriate; and if [the preceding dharma] has already ceased — then what condition can it be?

Since things, being devoid of own nature, have no being, the formula “when this is, that arises” turns out to be entirely unusable.

That fruit is present neither in the conditions taken separately nor in all of them together. How then can there arise from the conditions what is not in the conditions themselves?

But if the fruit, without existing [beforehand], nevertheless comes forth from those conditions — then why should it not just as well come forth from what is not a condition?

The fruit is made of conditions, but the conditions themselves are not made of themselves. How then can the fruit, which comes from what lacks an essence of its own, itself be made of conditions?

Therefore there is no fruit made either of conditions or of what is not a condition. And if there is no fruit — where then would the conditions or non-conditions themselves come from?