Chapter 2. Investigation of the Traversed and the Untraversed

The traversed is no longer traversed, the untraversed is likewise not traversed; and apart from the traversed and the untraversed, what is being traversed now is not traversed either.

nāgārjuna wrote:

apart from the traversed and the untraversed, what is being traversed now is not traversed either

Where there is motion, there is traversing; and since motion is in what is being traversed now, and not in the traversed nor in the untraversed, traversing is therefore in what is being traversed now.

pūrvapakṣin wrote:

traversing is therefore in what is being traversed now

How, then, is the traversing of what is being traversed now possible, when “what is being traversed” without traversing is impossible in the first place?

For anyone who asserts that “what is being traversed now” has [its own] traversing, it follows that there is “what is being traversed” without traversing — since it is [supposedly] traversed [by itself].

If “what is being traversed now” has traversing, a doubling of traversing follows: one, that by which it is “what is being traversed”, and a second, the traversing in it itself.

If a doubling of traversing follows, then two of the one who traverses follow as well, since without the one who traverses traversing is impossible.

If without the one who traverses traversing is impossible, then in the absence of traversing where is the one who traverses to come from?

The one who traverses does not traverse; likewise the one who does not traverse does not traverse; and who would that third one be, different from the one who traverses and from the one who does not traverse, that could traverse?

How can one assert at all that “the one who traverses traverses”, when without traversing the one who traverses is impossible in the first place?

For anyone who upholds the thesis “the one who traverses traverses”, there follows one who traverses without traversing — because he wants traversing for the one who traverses.

A doubling of traversing follows if the one who traverses traverses: one, that by which he is called “the one who traverses”, and a second, that, already being him, he also traverses.

In the traversed one does not begin to traverse, in the untraversed one likewise does not begin to traverse; and in what is being traversed now one does not begin either — so where, then, does one begin to traverse?

Before the beginning of traversing there is neither what is being traversed now nor the traversed, in which traversing could begin; and in the untraversed — where is traversing to come from?

What is the traversed, what is what is being traversed now, what is the untraversed — how are they to be told apart at all, when the very beginning of traversing is in no way visible?

The one who traverses cannot come to a stop; likewise the one who does not traverse cannot come to a stop; and who would that third one be, different from the one who traverses and from the one who does not traverse, that could come to a stop?

How can one assert at all that “the one who traverses can come to a stop”, when without traversing the one who traverses is impossible in the first place?

[Motion] does not come to a stop out of what is being traversed now, nor out of the traversed, nor out of the untraversed; for traversing, its beginning and its ceasing are alike [in nature, as far as this analysis goes].

“Traversing itself is the one who traverses” — it will not do [to say] this; “the one who traverses is something entirely other than traversing” — this will not do either.

For if traversing itself were the one who traverses, the identity of agent and action would follow.

And if the one who traverses were conceived as something entirely other than traversing, there would be traversing without the one who traverses, and the one who traverses without traversing.

If two [things] can be established neither through identity nor through difference, then how are they to be established at all?

By that traversing through which the one who traverses is called “the one who traverses” — by this traversing he does not traverse; for before traversing he does not exist, and yet someone [must] traverse something.

By that traversing through which the one who traverses is called “the one who traverses” — he does not traverse another one, different from it; for in one and the same one who traverses two traversings are impossible.

The one who traverses and really exists does not traverse traversing of the three kinds; and likewise the one who traverses and does not exist does not traverse traversing of the three kinds.

The one who both exists and does not exist does not traverse traversing of the three kinds; therefore there is no traversing, no one who traverses, and nothing to be traversed.