Chapter 6. Investigation of Desire and the One Who Desires

If the one who desires existed before desire — in himself, apart from desire — then desire would arise in dependence on him; desire would exist given the one who desires.

And if the one who desires does not exist, where would desire come from? And whether desire exists or does not exist, the same course [of argument] applies to the one who desires as well.

The simultaneous arising of desire and the one who desires does not work either; for then desire and the one who desires would be independent of each other.

In identity there is no coexistence — for something is never “together” with itself; and in separateness, where would coexistence come from?

If there were coexistence in identity, it would exist even without a companion; if there were coexistence in separateness, it would exist even without a companion.

And if there is coexistence in separateness, then what use is [it] to desire and the one who desires? [For then] their separate existence is already established — so where [would the need for] their coexistence [come from]?

If the separate existence of desire and the one who desires is already established, then for what purpose do you also invent their coexistence?

[You say]: “[They] are not established as separate” — and so you seek coexistence; and for the sake of establishing coexistence you once again need separateness.

And since separate existence is not established, coexistence is not established either; in what separate existence, as something present, do you wish to see coexistence?

Thus desire is established neither together with the one who desires nor apart from him; and as with desire, so the establishment of all dharmas does not [occur] either together or apart.