Chapter 7. Investigation of the Conditioned

If arising is conditioned, then the triad of marks applies to it; and if arising is unconditioned, how can it be a mark of the conditioned?

The triad that begins with arising, taken separately, is unable to perform the role of a mark of the conditioned; and how could they be together in one place, at one time?

If arising, duration and cessation have some further mark of the conditioned, then this is an infinite regress; and if there is none, then they themselves are not conditioned.

nāgārjuna wrote:

then this is an infinite regress; and if there is none, then they themselves are not conditioned

The arising of arising is the arising of the root arising alone; and the root arising, in its turn, produces the arising of arising.

abhidharmika wrote:

the root arising, in its turn, produces the arising of arising

If, as you say, the arising of arising produces the root arising, then, not itself produced by that root arising, how will it be able to produce it?

If, as you say, what is produced by the root [arising — that is, the arising of arising] produces the root, then how could that root, not yet produced by it, produce it?

This “that which is now arising” of yours — very well, let it produce this one, if that one, not yet born, were able to produce this one.

nāgārjuna wrote:

if that one, not yet born, were able to produce this one

Just as a lamp illuminates both itself and another, so too arising [supposedly] produces both itself and another.

abhidharmika wrote:

arising [supposedly] produces both itself and another

There is no darkness in the lamp, nor where the lamp is set up — [there is none there either]; what then does the lamp illuminate? For illumination is the destruction of darkness.

How is darkness destroyed by a lamp that is only now arising, when the lamp that is only now arising does not even reach the darkness?

And if darkness is destroyed by the lamp without any contact with it at all, then this [lamp], standing here, would destroy the darkness in the whole world.

If the lamp illuminates both itself and another, then darkness too will without doubt obscure both itself and another.

This arising, while not yet arisen, how will it produce itself? And if it has already arisen, then what is there still to produce in what is already born?

Neither that which is now arising, nor what has already arisen, nor what has not yet arisen arises in any way at all; this has already been explained [by the analysis] of what is now being traversed, of what has been traversed and of what has not been traversed.

If this “that which is now arising” does not enter into arising, then how can one say that “that which is now arising” [arises] in dependence on arising?

Whatever is dependently arisen is at peace by its own nature; therefore both “that which is now arising” and arising itself are at peace.

If somewhere there exists some existent that has not yet arisen, it could arise; [but] if there is no such existent — then what is it that arises?

If arising produces this “that which is now arising”, then what arising will produce this very arising?

If another arising produces it — [that gives] an infinite regress; and if it arises without a [prior] arising — then let everything arise in the same way.

The arising of an existent and of a non-existent alike is not admissible; likewise [it is not admissible] for what is both existent and non-existent — this has already been demonstrated earlier.

The arising of an existent that is now ceasing is impossible; and an existent that does not cease — precisely such an existent is impossible.

An existent that has not come to stand does not stand [on]; an existent that has come to stand does not stand [since the standing that has already established it is not added to it a second time]; and that which is now standing does not stand either; and what that has not arisen will stand?

The duration of an existent that is now ceasing is impossible; and an existent that does not cease — precisely such an existent is impossible.

Among all existents, which always have ageing and death for their nature, which existents are those that endure without ageing and death?

Duration endures through another duration — [and by this very fact it] is not admissible; just as the arising of arising is [admissible] neither through itself nor through another.

What has not yet ceased does not cease, nor does what has already ceased cease; and likewise “that which is now ceasing” — [does not cease]; and what that is unborn will cease?

The cessation of an existent that endures is not admissible; nor is the cessation of an existent that does not endure admissible.

For a state does not cease through that same state — it is not itself [by its own presence] that ceases; and a state does not cease through another state either — for it is not [an entirely] other one that ceases.

Since the arising of all dharmas is not possible, to that same extent the cessation of all dharmas is not possible either.

First of all, the cessation of an existent that is is not admissible; for in the identity [of one and the same thing] the existent and the non-existent [at once] are impossible.

Likewise the cessation of a non-existent existent is not admissible — just as there is no cutting off of a second head.

There is no cessation through itself, and no cessation through another; just as the arising of arising is neither through itself nor through another.

Since arising, duration and cessation are not established, the conditioned does not exist either; and if the conditioned is not established, how will the unconditioned be established?

Like an illusion, like a dream, like a city of the gandharvas — so, it is said, are arising, so duration, so cessation.